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ABSTRACT
We examine the empirical relation between labor unions and firm indebtedness in the con-
temporary United States. Our identification strategy exploits two negative exogenous shocks
in union power and the threat of unionization. Further, in the context of panel regressions,
we develop a novel firm-level proxy for the bargaining power of labor using collective bargain-
ing information from mandatory IRS filings from 1999 to 2013. Across a battery of tests, we
document evidence in favor of a crowding-out hypothesis - namely, a substitution effect be-
tween labor power and financial leverage. Notably, this effect is more pronounced in firms in
labor-intensive and unionized industries.
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In this paper, we exploit both a theoretical tension and a quasi-natural experimental de-
sign to uncover new and meaningful insights on the empirical relation between labor union
power and corporate financial leverage. Our study is motivated from the view that, despite
a decline in trade unionism in the United States over recent decades, labor unions still have
potentially significant effects on corporate decision-making and firm outcomes. Notably, the
capital structure literature has advanced two competing views regarding the relation between
the bargaining power of labor and financial leverage: (a) leverage used as a bargaining device;
(b) a labor vs. leverage crowding-out effect. While plausible arguments can be mounted in
either of these directions, it becomes an empirical question whether/which one of these views
dominates the other in contemporary market settings.
The bargaining device view predicts a positive relation between unionization and financial
leverage. Specifically, this perspective argues that financial leverage operates as a strategic
tool, limiting the appropriation of rents by workers (see, e.g., Matsa (2010), Bronars and Deere
(1991)). The general intuition behind these models is straight-forward. Unions and managers
effectively bargain over the distribution of future cash flows. Before meeting at the bargaining
table, the manager can lever up the firm and simultaneously return capital to shareholders (e.g.,
through a leveraged buyback or special dividend)—thereby capturing a portion of future cash
flows. Further, the increase in leverage moves the firm closer to financial distress/bankruptcy,
at some point reducing the quantum of rents that can be extracted by labor without risking
wide-spread worker displacement. Critically, these bargaining strategies are not only appealing
to currently unionised firms but (because workers can easily organize themselves into a union)
are also relevant to those non-unionized firms that are facing the real threat of unionization
(Bronars and Deere, 1991). Thus, the fundamental testable implication of these models is that
financial leverage is increasing in union power and the threat of unionization—which we label
the bargaining device hypothesis.
In contrast, the crowding-out perspective generates a negative labor-leverage prediction.
The intuition begins with the premise that unions impose economically significant costs on firms.
Of course, the most obvious cost is the union wage premium. In fact, the general consensus
is that the union wage premium is historically about 15% in the United States (Aidt and
Tzannatos, 2002). Additionally, union workers are more likely to receive costly fringe benefits
2
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
such as severance pay, paid holidays, paid sick leave, and access to pension plans. Because the
financial claims of labor out-rank debt-holders in the event of default, these increased costs
can be viewed as cash claims on a super-senior “debt-like” contract. Accordingly, these claims
“crowd-out” financial leverage, thereby reducing the firm’s debt capacity. Moreover, unions also
induce a degree of operating inflexibility in that they reduce the manager’s discretion in hiring
and firing decisions. This operating inflexibility is hypothesized to reduce financial leverage
(see, e.g., (Kuzmina, 2013, Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin, 2015)). In combination, these forces
deliver a crowding-out hypothesis predicting a substitution effect between financial leverage
and unionization.
We execute a battery of tests which pit these two competing perspectives against one an-
other, in the contemporary United States using firm-level data. Exploring this US context is
particularly important because major relevant changes have occurred in both labor and capital
markets which could have plausibly (and non-trivially) transformed the process driving pre-
vious empirical findings. For example, although Matsa (2010) documents a positive relation
between the bargaining power of labor and financial leverage, his findings are largely based on
quasi-experiments employing data drawn from a very different, and now somewhat historical,
era (in the 1950s - 1970s). A complete discussion of these contextual changes is deferred to
Section 1.
Our identification strategy involves two parts. Our primary approach exploits exogenous
variation in both union power and the threat of unionization using Right-to-Work legislation
in Oklahoma (2001) and Indiana (2012). We estimate the effects of the passage of these laws
on leverage using both difference-in-differences and a matching experiment. To supplement
this quasi-natural experimental design and to estimate the effect of union power on financial
leverage, we develop a novel measure of union power using mandatory IRS filings. Armed with
this new variable, we examine the relation between firm-level union power and financial leverage
using panel regressions with high-dimensional fixed effects (1999 to 2013).
Our main findings are readily conveyed. Both our quasi-experiments as well as our panel
regressions concordantly reveal a negative relation between the bargaining power of labor and
financial leverage, that is, we find evidence favoring the crowding-out hypothesis. Moreover,
this labor-leverage substitution effect is substantially stronger in firms which are more vulner-
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able to rent-seeking (i.e., firms operating in labor-intensive and traditionally union-intensive
industries). We also construct a test (albeit informal) designed to challenge the view that the
mechanism driving this negative relation is indeed related to excess labor costs. We are unable
to falsify this mechanism.
Our paper contributes to the literature on capital structure and labor by documenting robust
evidence of a negative relation between the bargaining power of labor and financial leverage in
the contemporary United States. We argue that our findings reflect the fact that (for reasons
fully explained in the paper) the “rules of the game” have changed and, accordingly, that the
bargaining device channel is no longer dominant. More broadly, we contribute to the growing
literature on the effects of labor on corporate financial decisions. Furthermore, we overcome
the challenge of finding a readily available and conceptually sound firm-level proxy for the
bargaining power of labor using information derived from annual mandatory IRS filings. This
novel measure brings significant advantages over extant measures.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the paper’s motivation
and provides a brief review of the relevant literature. Section 2 outlines our quasi-experimental
design and presents the results. Section 3 explains and presents the results of our panel regres-
sion model, and finally, Section 4 concludes.
1 Motivation and Literature Review
In one of the earliest papers on capital structure and labor, Bronars and Deere (1991)
develop a model which predicts that firms who face a higher threat of unionization will adopt
more aggressive leverage policies. The fundamental idea being that if bankruptcy is costly to
workers, debt can be used to protect shareholder wealth from union wage demands. In their
wage-setting model, workers balance the marginal costs of bankruptcy (i.e., job loss) with the
marginal benefits of a higher wage. The wage they select is inversely related to the level of
leverage. Using industry-level collective bargaining information, they find evidence of a positive
relation between the threat of unionization and financial leverage at the cross-section.
Similarly, Matsa (2010) also finds evidence in favor of the bargaining device perspective by
analyzing the effects of state labor regulations in the 1950s (i.e., Right-to-Work laws), 1960s,
and early 1970s (i.e., work stoppage provisions in unemployment insurance laws). However, we
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argue that non-trivial changes in both labor and capital markets have plausibly affected the
underlying processes driving previously observed relations.
One such significant change was the introduction of reorganization procedures under Chap-
ter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in 1978. This legislation provides that
any business can file for bankruptcy protection, allowing the debtor to retain control of the
business and to have six months to propose a reorganization plan. It also imparts other salient
rights such as the ability to refinance with new lenders and grant them priority over existing
creditors. These new provisions increase the firm’s bargaining power vis-a`-vis its’ creditors and
can enable the firm to force creditors into accepting an unfavorable renegotiation (Tirole, 2006).
In fact, under Chapter 11, labor unions may be eligible for positions on creditor committees.
The Committee has a variety of powers including the ability to investigate debtors for fraud
and incompetence as well as to request the dismissal of managers (Campello, Gao, Qiu, and
Zhang, 2015). Indeed, Campello, Gao, Qiu, and Zhang (2015) show that unionized firms are
15% more likely to emerge from bankruptcy (though union firms are also 6% more likely to
refile—indicating that labor unions can lead to inefficient reorganizations). Thus, Chapter 11
can be thought of as effecting two relevant changes. First, it increased the inherent renego-
tiability of debt and, second, it increased the influence of labor in default proceedings. Taken
together, these factors plausibly and significantly blunt the effect of debt as a bargaining de-
vice. Consistent with the notion that financial debt is no longer an effective bargaining device,
Brown, Fee, and Thomas (2009) find that leveraged recapitalizations are not associated with
negative abnormal returns to suppliers.
However, a second, and perhaps even more significant change was the emergence of plant-
level, rather than purely multi-employer and firm-level collective bargaining. This new form
of bargaining could have made redundant ‘strategic debt’ by allowing the development of al-
ternative dominant strategies that do not require the use of financial debt. For example, in
a plant-level setting the firm is able to threaten to downsize by closing one or more local
plants. This threat initiates a zero-sum game between plants in which local unions are forced
to out-concede each other. Consistent with this conjecture, there are several pieces of per-
suasive anecdotal evidence in the early 1990s that managers threatened to close local plants
to extract concessions from workers (Katz, 1993).1 To this same end, advances in technology
1As an additional example, Boeing shifted work from union plants in Washington State to a new non-union
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since the 1970s have resulted in improved capital mobility (Eschuk, 2002). This improvement
allows more firms to credibly threaten to relocate plants or to even outsource abroad if workers
attempt to extract excessive quasi-rents.
These alternative bargaining strategies are intuitively more appealing than the issuance of
financial debt when one considers the inherent moral hazard that arises between managers and
stockholders. Specifically, bankruptcy is a negative state of nature not only for non-executive
labor but also for top management. For example, Gilson (1989) finds that financial distress
increases managerial turnover from 19% to 52%. Further, Hotchkiss (1995) finds that 70% of
CEOs are replaced by the time a reorganization plan is implemented under Chapter 11. Taken
as a whole, it is hard to imagine why management would prefer to take a personal risk for the
benefit of stockholders when they could simply rely upon the tactics made available by decen-
tralization and increased capital mobility. Unlike debt, these new alternatives do not increase
the probability of executive turnover, while still extracting concessions from non-executive la-
bor.2 Notably, the CFO survey of Graham and Harvey (2001) fails to find substantial evidence
that the bargaining advantage of debt is a consideration in capital structure decisions.
These market and regulatory changes, coupled with recent evidence on the use and efficacy
of debt as a bargaining device motivates our study of the relation between unionization, the
threat of unionization and financial leverage in the contemporary United States.
2 Quasi-Experimental Design
Our analysis begins with a quasi-experimental design exploiting two separate, state-level
negative exogenous shocks in the bargaining power of labor. Specifically, our design begins with
the analysis of Right-to-Work legislation (RTW) in Oklahoma in 2001 using the Difference-in-
differences estimator. Oklahoma represents the cleanest regulatory change event relevant to our
research question. First, it is the only RTW event since the 1970s not confounded by corporate
taxation effects. And second, it also coincides with a significant increase in the private sector
union wage premium (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004), increasing the potential significance of
factory in South Carolina (Trottman, 2011).
2It is important to note that we are not suggesting that the moral hazard prevents the use of debt as a
bargaining device as in Matsa (2010). We are, however, suggesting that in its presence managers will exploit
these new alternative strategies instead.
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a policy intervention designed to weaken the bargaining power of labor.
2.1 Right-to-Work and Bargaining Power
Right-to-Work legislation provides that employees cannot be contractually compelled to join
or financially support a union even if they directly benefit from the actions of the union (e.g.,
a union shop clause). This legislative change makes it very difficult for the union to avoid the
free-rider problem. This reduces the amount of funding available per worker covered by the
union. Most importantly, this reduction in funding limits the union’s ability to contract high
quality experts (e.g., law firms) to assist in negotiations, thereby reducing the bargaining power
of organized labor (Matsa, 2010).3
However, RTW legislation also unambiguously reduces the bargaining power of non-organized
labor by reducing the threat of unionization. This diminution of power occurs because the ad-
vent of the free-rider problem reduces the net present value of the union formation investment
by workers. This exogenous reduction in the threat of unionization allows firms to pay their
non-organized workers lower wages. Indeed, consistent with this, Farber (2005) provides evi-
dence that the passage of Right-to-Work laws led to a reduction in non-union wages in both
Idaho (1987) and Oklahoma (2001).4
When considering the bargaining device literature, these two simultaneous effects generate
a simple prediction: Both unionized and non-unionized firms in the treated state are expected
to reduce their level of financial leverage following the intervention. Right-to-Work laws exoge-
nously reduce both union power and the threat of unionization. Conversely, the crowding-out
hypothesis predicts that all firms will increase leverage as the diminution in union power and
the threat of unionization reduces expected payouts to union and non-union workers. This
moderates the crowding-out effect of excess wages, allowing firms to take on more debt. More
formally:
H1a (Bargaining Hypothesis): firms reduce their financial leverage following the passage of
Right-to-Work laws.
H2a (Crowding-out Hypothesis): firms increase their financial leverage following the passage
3Eren and Ozbeklik (2011) find that RTW laws caused a 14.5% reduction in union membership in Oklahoma.
4 Though results for Oklahoma were statistically insignificant—probably because he uses Current Population
Survey data terminating in 2002, which was one year after the adoption of the RTW legislation in Oklahoma.
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of Right-to-Work laws.
2.2 Right-to-Work in Oklahoma
2.2.1 Data
We form our main sample using a Compustat file containing a total of 51,173 firm-years
from 1998 (t − 3) to 2004 (t + 3), being three years before and three years after the adoption
of RTW legislation in Oklahoma in 2001 (t = 0). Following standard practice, we drop all
firm-years for which the primary sector is financial (SIC: 6000–6999) or public utilities (SIC:
4900–4999) as well as firm-years with missing data for dependent or independent variables.
Additionally, we drop non-U.S. firms and firm-years with negative assets, shareholder equity,
and minority interests (balance sheet). This leaves us with 22,527 firm-year observations.
2.2.2 Difference-in-Differences Setup
The first estimation technique we employ is the difference-in-differences estimator (“DID”)
with additional covariates and fixed effects. As described above, because Right-to-Work laws
affect both union and non-union employees, we cannot use non-union firms as a within-state
control group. To this end, the chosen specification is given by:
Flevi,t = α0 + β1RTW + δ0POST + δ1RTW × POST + βkXk,i,t−1 + γj,t + ηi + i,t (1)
where i, j, and t index firms, industries, and years; Flevi,t represents a chosen measure of
financial leverage. Following the literature, we use the ratio of financial debt to book assets as
our primary choice to proxy the dependent variable. RTW is an indicator variable coded 1 for
firms incorporated in Oklahoma, and 0 otherwise; POST is an indicator variable coded 1 for
observations after 2001, being the year of the legislative change and 0 otherwise.
The object Xk,i,t−1 is a vector of time-variant financial controls typically used in leverage
studies and includes firm size, market-to-book, return on assets, asset tangibility, and modified
Z-score (see, e.g., (Matsa, 2010, Rajan and Zingales, 1995)). These variables are defined in
Panel B1 of Appendix B. The inclusion of covariates accounts for the possibility that the
samples within a group have systematically different characteristics in the two time periods
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(Wooldridge, 2010).5
The parameter γj,t represents industry-by-year fixed effects for industry j at time t. The
inclusion of industry-by-year fixed effects avoids the potential confounding linked to unobserved
time-varying industry-level effects (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). Additionally, and consistent
with Matsa (2010), we include firm fixed effects, represented by ηi, to avoid confounding by
time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity. Standard errors are clustered by state, allowing for
unspecified within-state correlation and are heteroskedastic-consistent. Further, in additional
tabulated robustness tests, we exclude those firms most likely to have been affected by the Dot-
com bubble (SIC 737) as well as those firm-years in which the sampled firm is not headquartered
in either Oklahoma or one of its’ neighboring states (Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, and Missouri,
New Mexico, and Texas).
2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the alternative proxies for our dependent
variable—financial leverage, while Panel B presents summary statistics for our chosen determi-
nants of financial leverage between 1998 and 2004. On average, a sample firm holds about 15%
(20%) of long-term debt relative to its’ total assets (book capital). When we include short-term
debt in our financial leverage measures, the recorded value of a firm’s debt holdings increases by
about 5-6%. On average, a sample firm has $1,045 million in net sales, ROA of 4%, 25% of its’
total assets in fixed assets, and a market-to-book ratio of 2.00. The average corporate default
spread is about 0.89% in our sample period. Further, the growth in gross state product is
3.78%, while the average state unemployment rate is 4.87%. Notably, the descriptive statistics
reported above are qualitatively similar to prior capital structure studies such as Heider and
Ljungqvist (2015).
[Place Table 1 about here]
5To ensure that our results are not driven by different specifications from Matsa (2010), we follow his
specification closely in our paper. For example, we include the same set of control variables, firm fixed effects,
industry by year fixed effects in our leverage regression and cluster standard errors by state.
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2.2.4 Firm Headquarter Locations
Because Compustat only reports the address of the firm’s current headquarters, the use of
the ‘state’ variable reported in the file results in an imperfect assignment of firms to treatment
and control groups (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). For example, if a firm is currently headquar-
tered outside Oklahoma but was headquartered in Oklahoma during the treatment period, it
would be erroneously assigned to the control group (i.e., misidentified as control). Similarly, if
a firm is currently headquartered in Oklahoma but was not headquartered in Oklahoma during
the treatment period, it would be erroneously assigned to the treatment group (i.e., misiden-
tified as treated). Both types of misidentification, as just described, have the effect of biasing
δ1 (our DID estimator in equation (1)) towards zero, a type II error. In other words, ex-ante,
this has the effect of increasing the probability of finding in favor of the null.
To fully correct for this, we would need to manually verify the headquarter location for all
firm-years using 10-Q forms.6 Given that this is an extremely onerous task (i.e., involving over
22,000 observations) and it is not perceived to be a material threat to the sign or significance
of our findings ex-post, we elect to fully correct for ‘misidentified as treatment’ errors but
only correct for ‘misidentified as control’ errors for Oklahoma’s six neighboring states (New
Mexico, Missouri, Colorado, Arkansas, Kansas, and Texas). To do so, we manually verify the
headquarter location using SEC’s EDGAR service for each relevant firm-year using the most
recent 10-Q form. These checks yield seven observations that would have been ‘misidentified as
treated’ (3.7% of the treatment group), and 15 observations that would have been ‘misidentified
as control’ (7.9% of the treatment group). We also identify eight observations in which the firm
moved its’ headquarters overseas as well as 472 observations in which firms headquartered in
a control state had relocated to another control state. We correctly reassign the 22 treatment
observations and delete the eight overseas observations, yielding a corrected sample of 22,519
firm-years. This corrected sample includes 49 unique Oklahoman firms, with an average of 27
in each year (minimum of 22).7
6 Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find that 10.1% of firm-years in their sample from 1989 to 2011 have incorrect
headquarters location on Compustat. However, most of these errors will not correspond to a misidentification
as they will relate to firms in control states relocating to other control states.
7To reduce any concerns that our results are driven by differences in the composition of our Oklahoman
sample pre- and post-intervention, we rerun the analysis with the added restriction that an Oklahoman firm
must appear at least once pre- and post-intervention. This analysis (untabulated) yields qualitatively similar
results.
10
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
2.2.5 Results for Right-to-Work In Oklahoma
Given the above discussion, in equation (1) the coefficient δ1 is interpreted as the impact of
the Right-to-Work law on leverage. According to the bargaining device hypothesis (Hypothesis
1a), we expect to find that firms in Oklahoma decrease their leverage (i.e., negative δ1) following
the intervention. Conversely, for the crowding-out hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a), we expect to
find that firms in Oklahoma increase their leverage (i.e., positive δ1) following the intervention.
[Place Table 2 about here]
Table 2 presents the outcome of the test just described. The coefficient of interest in
all regressions is the “Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × Post” coefficient. Consistent with the
dominance of the crowding out effect (i.e., H2a), Panel A of Table 2 indicates that the average
firm in Oklahoma meaningfully increased leverage following an unambiguous decrease in the
bargaining power of labor. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the estimation of equation (1) using our
full sample of firm-years as described in Section 2.2.4. To control for the potential impact of the
Dot-com recession, Column 2 presents the results when we restrict our sample to include only
those firm-years for which the primary industry group was not listed as computer programming,
data processing, and other computer related services (i.e., 3-digit SIC 737). Additionally, and
to ensure that our results are not being driven by local conditions, Column 3 presents the
results when our sample of non-internet firm-years is further restricted to Oklahoma and its’
neighboring states (Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas). Finally,
Column 4 provides results when we include state-level union membership as an additional
control variable to the Column 3 subsample. State-level union membership is defined as the
proportion of workers in a state who are union members (non-agricultural) and is provided by
Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). We include this variable in our specification because it is the
most reliable determinant of states’ right-to-work status (Moore, 1998).
Thus, our “strictest” estimate of the effect of RTW on leverage is provided in Column 4 of
Panel A/Table 2 and indicates that the average firm in Oklahoma increased financial leverage
by 210 basis points. Specifically, this estimate is not confounded by: time-invariant firm-specific
characteristics (firm fixed effects), industry-level shocks (industry-by-year fixed effects), changes
in time-varying determinants of capital structure (control variables), local shocks (neighboring
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states only), by firms affected by the Dot-com bubble (non-internet firms only) or by changes
in state-level union membership.
To get a clearer picture of the timing of the effects, we execute a dynamic analysis in
which we estimate the year-by-year difference in the difference between financial leverage in
Oklahoma and its’ neighboring states relative to the first year in our window (1998). The
regression specification is given in equation (2) and includes the same fixed effects and control
variables as the equation (1) regression:
Flevi,t = α0 +
+2∑
m=−3
βt−mY eart−m +
+2∑
m=−3
δt−mRTW ×Y eart−m +βkXk,i,t−1 +γj,t + ηi + i,t (2)
where i, j, and t index firms, industries, and years; Flev represents a measure of financial
leverage; Year is a series of year dummies taking a value of one for its’ respective year from 1999
to 2004, else 0. RTW is an indicator variable coded 1 for firms incorporated in Oklahoma, and 0
otherwise. The coefficient on each interaction variable RTW×Y eart−m represents the difference
between the average financial leverage of firms in Oklahoma and firms in its’ neighboring states
in a given year relative to the base case (1998). For example, RTW ×Y ear1999 is the difference-
in-differences (the difference of Oklahoma in 1999 and neighboring states in 1999 relative to
the difference of Oklahoma in 1998 and neighboring states in 1998) in financial leverage.
Given our Panel A Table 2 findings, we expect to find that the difference-in-differences
relative to 1998 are statistically significant and positive for each year following the treatment in
2001. Failure to find such a pattern would suggest evidence of a spurious analysis. The results
are presented in Panel B of Table 2. As expected, the estimated coefficients on “Right-to-Work
(Oklahoma) × Y ear2001 to 2004” are statistically significant, positive and economically important
in all years post-treatment. For example, in terms of the effect magnitude, average incremental
leverage is 450 basis points higher than base in 2004. Further, there is no evidence of a “pre-
treatment” effect as indicated by the insignificant coefficients on “Right-to-Work (Oklahoma)
× Y ear2000” and “Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × Y ear1999”.
Finally, we also expect to find that the results are much stronger in labor/union-intensive
industries. To test this, we re-estimate our primary DID model separately for those firms
in labor-intensive industries versus less labor-intensive industries. Specifically, each year we
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classify an industry (2-digit SIC) as labor intensive if this industry is ranked above the median
based on the ratio of the number of employees to total assets (employee ratio). Similarly, we
also follow Matsa (2010) and examine historically union-intensive industries. The economic
intuition here is that industries with a history of unionism are likely to have a stronger ex-ante
threat of unionization. Thus, Right-to-Work laws should affect firms in these industries more
than others. To this end, we classify an industry as union-intensive if it has at least 25% of its’
workforce covered by collective bargaining agreements in 1983 (Matsa, 2010).8
The results of these tests are presented in Panel C of Table 2. Specifically, Columns 1 and 2
presents the results when we restrict our sample to include only labor-intensive industries and
union-intensive industries, respectively. As expected, the estimated coefficient on the “Right-
to-Work (Oklahoma) × Post” interaction term is positive and significant. For comparison,
Columns 3 and 4 present the results when we restrict to the less labor-intensive and less union-
intensive counterpart subsamples. As predicted for these cases, the estimated coefficients on
these interaction terms are both statistically insignificant. We further perform a triple difference
analysis with the interaction term of “RTW × Post × LaborIntensiveIndustryDummy” (“RTW
× Post × UnionIntensiveIndustryDummy”) to formally test whether the crowding-out effect
coefficients are statistically different in labor vs. less-labor intensive industries, and unionized
vs. less-unionized industries, respectively. Our triple-difference analysis results in Columns (5)
and (6) confirm that the crowding-out effect is statistically more pronounced in both labor-
intensive and union-intensive industries, respectively.
2.2.6 Abadie-Imbens Matching Estimator
To further probe the robustness of the crowding out effect for the average firm, we also
use the matching estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (2002). As with other commonly
applied matching methods, this technique estimates the average treatment effect by comparing
the treatment group to a set of counterfactuals. Here, the counterfactuals are chosen from the
universe of possible controls by minimizing the Mahalanobis distance between user-specified
vectors of covariates (nearest neighbor). Finally, because matching on multiple covariates can
induce bias, a further adjustment is made to minimize any remaining bias (Abadie and Imbens,
8Union-intensive industries include the following 2-digit SIC codes: 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 26, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 54, 78, and 82.
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2002).9
Similar to our DID analysis, we match firms on size, tangibility, market-to-book ratio, ROA,
and Zprob. We also restrict our universe of potential controls to include only Oklahoma’s
neighboring states. To increase the ex-ante power of the test, we make the same headquarters
corrections described in Section 2.2. The outcome variable is the difference between the pre-
and-post-three-year average of financial debt to book capital. We use heteroskedastic-consistent
standard errors for inference.
The outcome of the Abadie-Imbens test is presented in Panel A of Table 3. Similar to the
difference-in-differences method, this technique produces statistically significant results (at the
10% level) that support the existence of a negative relation.
[Place Table 3 about here]
Again, we also check for pre-existing trends by executing a placebo test in the style of
Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012). For this test, all aforementioned de-
sign aspects remain intact with one critical exception: the “treatment” period is arbitrarily
reassigned to a pre-treatment year. We do this for each of the three years prior to the treat-
ment (i.e., the year 2000, 1999, and 1998). A significant result for any of these placebo tests
could be viewed as evidence of a pre-existing trend, or placebo effect (Almeida, Campello,
Laranjeira, and Weisbenner, 2012). The results of this test are presented in Panel B of Table 3.
Based on conventional levels of significance, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, suggesting
that there is no evidence of any pre-existing trends.10
2.2.7 Discussion of the Case of Oklahoma
Despite our best efforts to ensure the validity of our results, if there are any other contempo-
raneous events that impact capital structure decisions we might still be erroneously attributing
the effects of these unobserved changes to the RTW legislation. Possible confounding events
9Due to a small sample, we do not rely on exact industry matching. This ensures that our results will not
be driven by “distant” matches with respect to important covariates (e.g., comparing small firms to big firms in
the same industry). Having said that, in a separate analysis of firms in union-intensive industries (with sector
matching) we find qualitatively similar results. Details of this analysis are available upon request.
10To augment the matching estimator results presented in this sub-section, we also obtain estimates using the
Synthetic Control Method (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010, 2015). The details of these analyses are
provided in the Internet Appendix (see Table IA.1 and Figure IA.1). The Synthetic Control Method compares
the average change in financial leverage for firms headquartered in Oklahoma versus a ‘Synthetic’ Oklahoma.
This alternative estimator obtains qualitatively similar results to our analysis here.
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include state-level changes to the corporate tax rate and governance requirements. However,
it is not apparent that any such changes to Oklahoma’s tax code occur during the relevant
window—the closest we can find is a change to Oklahoma’s corporate tax rate which occurred
11 years prior to the treatment in 1990 (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). Further, we are unaware
of any state-level shocks to governance requirements.
2.3 Right-to-Work in Indiana
Heretofore, we have only presented experimental evidence on a single case, Oklahoma.
This is because it is the only “clean” RTW experiment that has occurred since 1976. For
example, while RTW also became effective in Idaho in 1987, this is contaminated by a coinciding
corporate income tax increase. Similarly, RTW legislation was amended in Texas in 1993,
however, in 1992 the Franchise Tax levied on corporations in Texas was rewritten to include
a 4.5% tax on “earned surplus” which includes corporate profits plus compensation paid to
officers and directors.11
Most recently, RTW legislation was also adopted in Indiana and Michigan in 2012. In
the case of Michigan, this event is confounded by the replacement of the Michigan Business
Tax with the Corporate Income Tax.12 Such a regime switch may have led to uncertain tax
positions during transition. In Indiana however, changes to corporate taxation involved the
commencement of staggered reductions in the corporate income tax rate. Because leverage
does not respond to tax cuts (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015) and the changes are unambiguous,
the case of Indiana represents an additional opportunity to falsify our findings.13
The setup here mirrors our analysis of the Oklahoma case. The final sample includes all
active and inactive U.S. firm-years from 2009 to 2014 with non-missing data and for which
the primary sector is non-financial (SIC: 6000–6999) or public utilities (SIC: 4900–4999). We
also exclude Michigan from the analysis due to its’ adoption of RTW in 2013 and corporate
tax rate changes in 2012.14 Headquarter locations are corrected following the same procedure
11We are also concerned that the amendment in Texas was merely symbolic. Texas initially adopted RTW in
1947.
12The Michigan Business Tax included a 4.95% income tax as well as a 0.8% receipts tax. In 2012, this tax
was effectively repealed and was replaced by a 6% corporate income tax.
13Notably, if Indiana firms do respond to tax cuts by reducing their leverage as prescribed by the trade-off
theory, then it should work against us finding support for the crowding-out effect.
14The inclusion of Michigan in our sample does not affect our findings.
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as before.15 This sample includes 14,830 firm-years (with 181 firm-years in Indiana across 44
firms). Our specification is given by equation (1) and is repeated below for convenience:
Flevi,t = α0 + β1RTW + δ0POST + δ1RTW × POST + βkXk,i,t−1 + γj,t + ηi + i,t (1)
where i, j, and t index firms, industries, and years; Flevi,t represents a measure of financial
leverage (the ratio of financial debt to book assets); RTW is an indicator variable coded 1
for firms incorporated in Indiana, and 0 otherwise; POST is an indicator variable coded 1
for observations after 2012, being the year of the legislative change and 0 otherwise. The
parameter Xk,i,t−1 is the same vector of time-variant financial controls used in our Oklahoma
test. The parameter γj,t represents industry-by-year fixed effects for industry j at time t.
The parameter ηi represents firm fixed effects. Following Matsa (2010), Heider and Ljungqvist
(2015), standard errors are clustered by state, allowing for unspecified within-state correlation
and are heteroskedastic-consistent.
The results from these tests are presented in Table 4. Because we only have two years of post-
intervention data, and because Right-to-Work laws were initially found to be unconstitutional
in late 2013, we provide two alternative estimation windows: 2009 to 2013 (one year post-RTW
in Indiana) in Panel A; and 2009 to 2014 (two years post) in Panel B. Because of the successful
legal challenge just mentioned as well as the fact that RTW was not upheld by the Supreme
Court until November 2014, we expect to find stronger results using the shorter estimation
window (Panel A).
[Place Table 4 about here]
Based on the results reported in Table 4, we are unable to falsify our previous finding that
firms in RTW-affected states, increase their leverage following legal intervention. Results in
Panel A indicate that firms in Indiana increased book leverage in response to the passage of
Right-to-Work. Consistent with expectations, our findings are much stronger in the shorter-
period. In fact, results for the longer estimation window are statistically insignificant (Panel
B). This is plausibly explained by the aforementioned challenge to the legality of RTW in
Indiana.16
15We correct 3.01% of headquarter locations in the 2009 to 2014 sample.
16In addition to RTW legislation, we also search for changes to Work Stoppage Provisions in Unemploy-
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3 Panel Regression Evidence
The second step of our identification strategy involves the exploitation of a novel treatment
variable designed to capture within-firm evolutions in union power. This is critically impor-
tant because Right-to-Work laws (and labor laws in general) might not be passed in a random
portfolio of laws. For instance, the passage of RTW could be accompanied with other gener-
ally pro-business legislation or may signal an ex-ante increased probability of observing such
legislation in the near future. Thus, any examination of labor laws in isolation runs the risk
of faulty inference as a result of unobserved, correlated legislation.17 To combat this concern,
as a supplementary analysis, we exploit a panel regression model with high-dimensional fixed
effects which is not vulnerable to these types of threats.
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
We use two databases to construct our regression sample. We obtain financial and account-
ing information from the merged CRSP-Compustat database and data on firm-level collective
bargaining coverage from the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Open Government Dataset, EBSA
(Employee Benefits Security Administration) Form 5500 series. These collective bargaining
data span the period 1999 to 2013.18
ment Insurance Legislation (WSP) using Bureau of Labor Statistics reports on changes in state and federal
unemployment insurance laws. These searches reveal one significant change to WSPs in Michigan (2002). This
change provides that workers who become unemployed as a result of a strike that is not allowed under the
bargaining contract or is a wildcat strike, have their ineligibility period for monetary unemployment benefits
extended from 6 to 13 weeks. This would arguably reduce the bargaining power of labor in Michigan since it
increases the personal risk of striking, which is a powerful bargaining device for labor. In unreported analysis,
we redo our difference-in-differences financial leverage regression by replacing “RTW × Post” with “WSP ×
Post”, we document statistically significant and positive coefficient for “WSP × Post” which is consistent with
a negative relation between the bargaining power of labor and financial leverage. However, this is not a fully
reliable falsification test because the change in WSP in Michigan might be confounded by a contemporaneous
increase in the level of general unemployment benefits by approximately 21%, which is also hypothesized to
induce a positive leverage response (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013).
17This problem is still present in large samples of events.
18In addition to the modern dataset, raw data for 1991 to 1998 are available from the Department of Labor
through a Freedom of Information request and a small processing fee. These data are delivered as simple text
files with a codebook describing the position of each item. No additional instructions are provided. We do not
rely on these data for three main reasons. First, unlike the more recent dataset, they do not take advantage
modern, electronic filing technologies, dramatically increasing the number of expected errors. Second, the 1999
reporting reforms combined several 5500 forms into a single, streamlined submission, more than tripling the
number of observations. Third, in the instructions to filers, the description of active participants changed in
1999. After 1998, the description of active participants no longer explicitly mentions that participants include
those employees who are below the permitted disparity level on plans that are integrated with social security.
This may have led to a revision in participant counts by some filers.
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The development of our full sample proceeds as follows. We start with all active and inactive
firms covered by the merged CRSP-Compustat database. This file contains 178,313 firm-year
observations between 1999 and 2013. Following conventional practice, we use the same basic
filtering process as described in Section 2.2.1 by excluding those firm-years for which the primary
industry was either financial (SIC: 6000–6999) or public utilities (SIC: 4900–4999). We do this
because these firms are heavily influenced by regulation. This leaves us with 118,536 firm-years.
We then drop all non-U.S. firms and firm-years with negative values for assets, stockholder’s
equity, or minority interests (balance sheet). This leaves 86,840 firm-years.
Next, we merge this sample with the EBSA Form 5500 datasets by the sponsor’s Employer
Identification Number (“EIN”) and year and obtain matches for 44,338 firm-years. Finally,
we exclude firm-year observations with missing data for dependent, treatment, and control
variables (Matsa, 2010). This yields an unbalanced panel of 28,574 firm-year observations
encompassing a cross-sectional dimension including 4,596 firms operating across 60 different
sectors (2-digit SIC). Continuous variables are then winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
to eliminate the effect of outliers (Matsa, 2010).
3.2 Dependent Variable: Financial Leverage
Mirroring the quasi-experimental design, our primary dependent variable is the ratio of
financial debt to book assets. However, we also provide estimates for eight alternative and
meaningful measures of leverage. Our findings hold regardless of how we define leverage.19
3.3 Treatment Variable: Largest Pension Bargaining Unit
Similar to Becker and Olson (1992), Ramı´rez Verdugo (2006), our treatment variable is con-
structed using collective bargaining information from IRS Form 5500 submissions. Employers
who have established a pension- or welfare-benefit plan covered by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (1974) are required to file a Form 5500 with the Department of Labor
every year. These annual filings, which are open for public inspection, are required for each
plan offered by the employer and include two pages of general plan information as well as 13
accompanying schedules.20 In order to improve compliance as well as the fidelity of the digi-
19All of these measures, including our control variables are defined in Appendix B.
20An example Form 5500 can be downloaded from http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2014-5500.pdf.
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tized records, the Department of Labor significantly revised the Form in 1999 to make it more
consistent with a corporate tax return and launched EFAST (Electronic Filing Acceptance Sys-
tem). The EFAST system enables filers to submit machine-print and machine-readable forms
and schedules that can be recorded much more reliably.21
The information we extract from each plan-level observation includes: (1) the sponsor’s
employer identification number (EIN); (2) the declaration of collective bargaining; (3) the total
number of active employees covered; and (4) benefit codes identifying key plan features. More
specifically, we interpret the declaration that the plan was collectively-bargained as evidence
that the submission relates to a union plan rather than a non-union plan. Next, we identify
filings related to retirement pensions using codes that identify the plan as either a defined
contribution plan or a defined benefit plan.22
For our primary analyses, we proxy for the bargaining power of labor using the ratio of the
largest pension bargaining unit (LPBU) to total employees:
LPBUi,t =
Active Employees on Largest Collectively Bargained Pension P lani,t
Total Employeesi,t
(3)
where subscripts i and t index firm and year, respectively. Our estimate for the total number of
employees comes from Compustat. Plan participants are classified as ‘active employees’ if they
are currently in employment covered by the plan and are earning or retaining credited service
under the plan. This includes non-vested (e.g., recently hired) employees as well as eligible
non-participants. We interpret LPBU as the relative size of the largest potential collective
bargaining unit at the firm-level.23
21No errors in electronic filings were found in the 2005 audit of EFAST recordings by the Office of the Inspector
General. In 2009, this system was further improved with the launch of EFAST2. The two most significant
improvements in this second iteration of EFAST included the complete transition to accurate, paperless filing
as well as the introduction of monthly updates to datasets from 2009. These monthly updates automatically
remove erroneous, obsolete filings that would otherwise remain in the dataset. Full records for the modern
dataset (1999 to 2013) are available from the Department of Labor’s website in comma separated text files.
22Results from our panel regressions remain qualitatively similar when we only consider defined benefit plans.
23In unreported analyses we also estimate a triple difference-in-differences specification using LPBU. Although
we document evidence consistent with our primary findings in Section 2, multicollinearity renders such an
analysis as less than reliable.
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3.3.1 LPBU versus Extant Measures
We argue that our measure (equation (3)) better reflects variation in the bargaining power
of labor vis-a`-vis the firm relative to alternative proxies that rely on total unionization for
two main reasons. First, is the emergence of fragmented collective bargaining (e.g., plant-
level bargaining) where the firm separately negotiates with its’ bargaining units (Eschuk, 2002,
Katz, 1993). More specifically, because estimates of total unionization either implicitly or
explicitly sum across all unions in the numerator, they do not consider this new reality. Second
and relatedly, there is convincing evidence that fledgling collective bargaining units do not
induce a leverage response in U.S. firms in at least the first three years (Lee and Mas, 2012).
This unresponsiveness is likely because collective bargaining units require time to develop and
establish themselves within a firm or plant. In fact, in some cases it might even take up to
a decade before a collective bargaining unit has any effective bargaining power (Lee and Mas,
2012). Since we are interested in proxying for bargaining power, by tracking changes in only
the largest collective bargaining unit, we find appealing a measure like this since it reduces
the amount of variation caused by changes in less powerful and fledgling collective bargaining
units.24
In addition to these conceptual improvements, we argue that our measure also offers four
practical advantages over estimates of total unionization. First, LPBU does not rely upon
voluntary disclosures of collective bargaining (see, e.g., Eschuk (2002), Matsa (2010), Cheng
(2011)). This avoids the problems associated with potential biases caused by firms disclosure
incentives. For example, because news of increased union activity is associated with declines
in value (Lee and Mas, 2012), we expect that estimates of total unionization derived from
voluntary disclosures will be downwardly biased. For example, if a firm experiences an increase
in union activity, managerial incentives could plausibly lead to either a misreporting or even
the complete cessation of disclosure. Thus, by relying upon disclosures that are mandated by
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code, we avoid these types of biases.
Second, our construct does not require extensive hand collection, allowing for easy replica-
tion and adoption. Third, our measure allows for the systematic identification of an evidence-
based control group, avoiding the need to include random firms and assume that they are
24Results remain very similar when we sum across all union retirement plans at the firm level in the numerator
of equation (3).
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non-unionized (see, e.g., Matsa (2010)). Fourth, our measure generates a richer panel in the
sense that it produces viable estimates across a larger, more diverse set of firms—well beyond a
relatively narrow subset of manufacturing firms (approximately 1,140 firm-years in total across
1977 and 1987), as is commonly constrained by the surveys of Hirsch (1991).
Finally, we acknowledge that our matching algorithm will not consider collectively bar-
gained pension plans sponsored by the firm’s wholly owned subsidiaries reporting under differ-
ent EINs.25 In order to fully correct for this, we would need the EINs of every wholly-owned
subsidiary of every firm for every year in our sample. Such a research design choice is prohibitive
because these data are not readily available, especially over sufficiently large and representative
samples. A random check of our algorithm suggests that the potentially distorting effect of
wholly-owned subsidiaries is negligible in our sample.26
3.4 Summary Statistics
3.4.1 Largest Pension Bargaining Unit
Table 5 presents summary statistics for our treatment variable, LPBU. Panel A indicates
that across our full sample, the conditional density of the largest pension bargaining unit
is 34.49% with a standard deviation of 31.42%. Panel B provides unconditional means and
standard deviations for each of eight industry divisions defined by the Department of Labor as
well as for all firms. We find evidence of union pension bargaining in all divisions, however, this
activity is most intense in the manufacturing, transportation and communications, wholesale
trade, and mining divisions. Across the full sample, the unconditional density of the largest
pension bargaining unit is 4.10% with a standard deviation of 15.55%.
[Place Table 5 about here]
Figure 1 depicts the trend in the relative size of the largest pension bargaining unit over
time for each of eight industry divisions in our full sample with more than 1,000 firm-year
observations. In general, LPBU has increased over time in our sample.
25We find several instances in which subsidiaries report using their parent firm’s EIN.
26Specifically, we investigate the potential significance of this issue by randomly selecting 60 firm-years from
2005 (30 with union pensions and 30 without union pensions) and check the accuracy of our algorithm. Although
we find a large number of plans being reported by subsidiaries with different EINs, they tend to be significantly
smaller than plans reported by the parent firm. In fact, we find that our algorithm correctly identifies the
numerator of our measure in 59 of 60 observations. In practical terms, this suggests that our matching algorithm
is unaffected by wholly owned subsidiaries reporting with different EINs.
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[Place Figure 1 about here]
3.4.2 General Firm Characteristics
Panel A of Table 6 contains basic summary statistics for all variables used in our primary
panel analyses. The average firm in the sample is quite large, with annual sales of $1,784
million (median of $229 million), with a return on assets of 5%, and an earnings volatility of
approximately 8% (three year standard deviation of the change in EBITDA scaled by three
year mean assets). On average, tangible assets and capital expenditures make up 23% and
5% of total assets, respectively. As expected, research and development intensity exhibits high
positive skewness with a mean of 37% contrasting a median of just 1%. Similarly, Tobin’s Q
also exhibits positive skewness with a mean value of 1.50 versus a median value of 0.96. Finally,
mean book leverage (financial debt to book assets) is 0.17 and mean long-term book leverage
(long-term financial debt to book assets) is 0.15.
Panel B of Table 6 presents univariate tests of equivalence between sampled unionized and
non-unionized firms. These tests confirm that unionized firms are significantly different to
non-unionized firms with respect to all variables at the 1% level. Moreover, at the mean,
economically significant differences exist for size, Tobin’s Q (and market-to-book), tangibility,
ROA (return on assets), earnings volatility, bankruptcy risk (Zprob), research and development
intensity, and four alternative measures of leverage.
In our sample, unions tend to operate in much larger, more stable, more profitable firms
with lower value, proxied by Tobin’s Q, and in firms that maintain a higher proportion of fixed
assets. Finally, unionized firms exhibit considerably higher financial debt ratios than their
non-unionized counterparts but are significantly further from bankruptcy.
Crucially, from a research design perspective, the pervasive finding of non-equivalence
between the two groups motivates the use of a firm fixed effects approach, since such non-
equivalence very likely extends to include unobserved, time-invariant, firm-specific variables.27
[Place Table 6 about here]
27Ignoring this issue would render our analysis unreliable due to non-trivial endogeneity threats (Parsons and
Titman, 2009).
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3.5 Panel Regression Specification
To test our hypothesis, we follow the advice of Gormley and Matsa (2014) and estimate a
panel regression with high-dimensional fixed effects. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors,
clustered at the firm-level are used for inference (Matsa, 2010). Specifically, the regression
specification is:
Flevi,t = α0 + β1LPBUi,t−1 + βkXk,i,t−1 + γj,t + ηi + i,t (4)
where i, j, and t index firms, industries, and years; the parameter Flevi,t represents a given
measure of financial leverage and our main variable of interest (LPBU) is measured as the ratio
of the number of active staff covered by the largest collectively bargained retirement pension
to the total number of employees (i.e., equation (3)). The vector, Xk,i,t−1 contains the same
control variables used in our quasi-experiment. The measurement, predicted signs, and a brief
motivation of all of these variables is summarized in Panel B2 of Appendix B. The parameter γj,t
represents industry-by-year fixed effects, while ηi represents firm fixed effects.
28 Since increases
in LPBU indicate increases in union power at the firm-level, our hypotheses are as follows:
H1b (Bargaining Hypothesis): there is a positive relation between union power and financial
leverage (i.e., β1 > 0)
H2b (Crowding-out Hypothesis): there is a negative relation between union power and finan-
cial leverage (i.e., β1 < 0)
3.6 Baseline Analysis
Table 7 presents the estimation of equation (4). Consistent with our quasi-experiment, we
find evidence of a negative relation between union power and financial leverage for the average
firm in our sample. We gauge economic significance by comparing the predicted effect of an
increase in LPBU from 0.00% to 34.41% (conditional mean) to the non-unionized sample’s
mean leverage ratio.
28To discriminate between a fixed effects model and a random effects model, we apply the Hausman Specifi-
cation Test. These results indicate that the fixed effects estimator is preferred to the random effects estimator
at the 1% significance level. These results are not reported for brevity. Further, we do not use limited depen-
dent variable models such as the Tobit model because the fixed effects estimator is biased in nonlinear models
(Greene, 2002).
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[Place Table 7 about here]
To this end, based on the results presented in Column 1 of Table 7, an average firm with
34.45% of its’ workforce in a single bargaining unit is associated with a leverage ratio (FDAT)
that is 62 basis points lower than an average non-unionized firm. This represents a reduction in
financial leverage of 3.9% relative to the mean leverage ratio of non-unionized firms. In the case
of long-term financial debt to book assets as an alternative proxy for the dependent variable,
this same change is associated with a 4.7% reduction.
These findings hold regardless of the measure of leverage used. Panel B reports the results
of identical regressions on the ratio of financial debt to market assets, financial debt to market
capital, total liabilities to market assets, and total liabilities to book assets (defined in Appendix
B). As an additional robustness check (reported in Column 5 of Panel B), we re-estimate our
model using the subset of firm-years with non-zero financial debt, non-zero LPBU, and a Cook’s
Distance of less than 4 divided by the number of observations. The purpose of this test is to
ensure that our results are not being driven by zero-leverage firms (see, e.g., Strebulaev and
Yang (2013)), zero-LPBU firms, or by influential outliers (Cook’s Distance). Our results remain
robust.29, 30 Overall, our baseline results strongly support the view that higher labor bargaining
power crowds out financial leverage for the average firm in our sample.
3.7 Exploring the Underlying Mechanism
One possible, alternative explanation for the negative coefficient on LPBU is that it reflects
the strategic reduction of corporate cash holdings (Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina, 2009).
In other words, are these firms actually deliberately responding to an increase in the bargaining
power of labor by reducing their cash holdings by retiring debt? Following this argument, such
a reduction in cash shores-up the firm’s bargaining position by (allegedly) credibly signaling
liquidity constraints. Thus, should we observe our sample firms systematically opting to retire
debt to reduce cash holdings, an alternative mechanism is likely at play.
29Because our algorithm identifies pension plans using codes submitted by the direct filing entity, there remains
a small chance that our results are being driven by filer error. To control for any potential miscoding, we take
advantage of the declaration of the attachment of retirement schedules as an alternative method of identifying
retirement plans. The Internet Appendix documents a robust negative relation using this alternative analysis
(refer to Table IA.2).
30Table IA.3 in our Internet Appendix also shows that our panel regression results are robust to the inclusion
of additional control variables.
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To rule out this alternative scenario, we run a cash holdings regression on LPBU with firm
and industry-by-year fixed effects.31 If this explanation has merit in our sample, we would
expect to find that the LPBU coefficient is negative and statistically significant. However,
in results reported in the Internet Appendix (see Table IA.4), each and every cash holdings
regression fails to find any evidence of a relation between LPBU and corporate cash holdings,
suggesting that our main results are not driven by the strategic reduction in cash holdings.
However, ruling out this alternative explanation does not guarantee that the negative re-
lation in our sample is, indeed, being driven by excess costs associated with labor unions
(e.g., wage markups). To directly test the crowding-out effect, we ideally need to observe the
wage-effects of labor unions at the firm-level. Unfortunately, comprehensive ‘micro’ wages data
needed for such an analysis are not readily available. An obvious alternative strategy would be
to test for a positive relation between the relative size of the largest pension bargaining unit
(LPBU) and the firm’s reported wage bill. Again however, this strategy is met with significant
data issues. For example, Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009) find that
Compustat only reports “Labor and Related Expenses” for 18% of firm-years between 1995
and 2005. Further, Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009) additionally
find that firms non-randomly choose to report labor expenses as a separate line item.32 This
acute self-selection bias could easily lead to spurious inferences regarding the relation between
LPBU and wages.
More pragmatically, in light of the above issues, we conduct an informal investigation of the
relation between LPBU and reported “Pension and Retirement Expenses” from Compustat.
If increases in LPBU are associated with excess remuneration in the form of more valuable
pensions, we would expect to observe a positive relation between LPBU and pension and
retirement expenses reported on the income statement.
For defined contribution plans, employer-contributions are directly expensed on the income
statement. For defined benefit plans, expenses reflect changes in the pension’s liability relative
to the pension’s return. Thus, increases in the defined benefit promised to employees results in
31The dependent variable is defined as the natural log of the ratio of cash to net assets. We also follow Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) to include the following control variables: market-to-book ratio, log
of deflated net assets, cash flow/net assets, net working capital capital/net assets, industry sigma, R&D/sales,
leverage, and a dividend dummy. For more details on these control variable definitions, refer to Table IV of
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999).
32The sample of firms who report “Labor and Related Expenses” are also dominated by financial firms, which
are restricted from our analysis.
25
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
an increased expense, ceteris paribus. To this end, our chosen specification is:
PREit = α0 + β1LPBUi,t−1 + ηi + i,t (5)
where i and t index firms and years. The dependent variable PREit is reported pension and
retirement expenses ($) scaled by the number of employees. The variable LPBU is measured as
the ratio of the number of active staff covered by the largest collectively bargained retirement
pension to the total number of employees (i.e., equation (3)). Because the dependent variable
is highly sensitive to the unique characteristics of the firm’s pension offerings, we include firm-
fixed effects, denote by η to sweep out any unobserved, time-invariant, firm-level heterogeneity.
Finally, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
The results of this informal analysis are presented in Equation (6). Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
PREit = α0 + 511.46
(186.64)
LPBUi,t−1 + ηi + i,t (6)
Observations = 24,992; Adj R2=75.1%; R2 Within=1.4%
Consistent with the crowding-out mechanism, we find evidence of a strong positive as-
sociation between LPBU and reported pension and retirement expenses at the 1% level of
significance. Indeed, our results suggest that an average unionized firm (34.45% of employees
in a single bargaining unit) is associated with an incremental increase in retirement and pension
expenses of approximately $176 per employee. For the average unionized firm in our sample,
this represents an economically significant total expense of around $3.58 million per year.33
Accordingly, we interpret this as suggestive evidence consistent with the view that increased
labor costs is at least one of the mechanisms driving the crowding-out effect.
This is in contrast to a stricter interpretation of the crowding-out effect which suggests that
the sole mechanism is operating leverage caused by increased hiring and firing costs (see, e.g.,
Kuzmina (2013)). On an intuitive level, this would appear to present an immediate threat to our
33These results are not confounded by the introduction of SFAS 87, Employers Accounting for Pensions
since it occurred 14 years prior to the beginning of our sample. Additionally, our findings are unlikely to be
confounded by the introduction of SFAS 158, Employers Accounting for Defined Benefit Pensions and Other
Postretirement Plans in 2006 as well as the amendment of SFAS 132 in 2003 because they did not change
existing rules regarding measurement or recognition.
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crowding-out interpretation—don’t unions simultaneously increase job security by increasing
the cost of firing unionized workers?34 If this is the case, then we need to offer some assurance
that our findings do not solely reflect labor-rigidity. We note two objections here. First, the
link between RTW’s affect on all firms and the cost of firing appears tenuous. In fact, ex-ante,
we are unable to come up with a compelling argument that our design can be considered a test
of operating flexibility. This natural insulation supports the relevance of excess labor costs.
Second, and rather curiously, it is also worth noting that in spite of the intuition linking
unionization to increased firing costs, prior evidence suggests that unionized manufacturing
firms experience more layoffs (particularly temporary) than their non-unionized counterparts
during business cycle fluctuations (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Aidt and Tzannatos (2002)
argue that this paradox might be explained by self-serving senior union officials who barter
deals to layoff junior workers in return for the preservation of senior workers positions and
wages. Thus, the misalignment of incentives between union stewards and junior members may
distort the actual relation between unionization and operating flexibility. In sum, while we do
not take issue with the literature regarding firing costs and leverage, we do argue that our tests
are more revealing of the importance of excess labor costs.
4 Conclusion
Despite the decline in trade unionism in the United States, organized labor still has plausi-
bly important impacts on financial policies. Our paper provides new evidence on the relation
between financial leverage and union power as well as the threat of unionization. Using a robust
research design involving both quasi-experimental and regression evidence, we document the ex-
istence of a negative relation between union power (and the threat of unionization) and financial
leverage in the contemporary United States. Specifically, we find that firms in both Oklahoma
(2001) and Indiana (2012), chosen because of their ideal settings, respond to an exogenous
weakening in union power and the threat of unionization by increasing financial leverage. We
also document heterogeneous treatment effects. Specifically, in our quasi-experiments, we find
that the passage of RTW has a significantly stronger effect in firms who operate in labor-
34Although unions are interested in both wage gains and job security, private sector unions appear to be much
more interested in the former (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002).
27
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
intensive industries and industries which are traditionally union-intensive. In other words, the
overall evidence supports a “crowding-out” effect.
Further, and to guard against the possibility that our findings are not being driven by
unobserved, correlated legislative changes, we also exploit panel regression analysis. In these
regressions, we develop a novel treatment variable derived from mandatory disclosures on union
pension coverage over the period 1999 to 2013. Our regression results are consistent with the
quasi-experimental design. Increases in the relative size of the largest union bargaining unit are
associated with reductions in financial leverage. These results are strongly robust in favor of the
“substitution” effect between labor power and financial leverage, captured by the crowding-out
hypothesis.
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5 Tables and Figures
Table 1
Summary Statistics—Quasi Experiment Analysis
Our sample consists of 22,519 firm-year observations for all non-financial and non-utility U.S. companies between
1998 and 2004. 1998 (2004) is the three years prior to (after) the adoption of the 2001 Right-to-Work law in
Oklahoma. This table tabulates summary statistics for our dependent variables in Panel A and the controls in
Panel B, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Panel A: Dependent Variable Measures
Variable Mean StDev 25th Median 75th Min Max
Financial Debt to Assets 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.15 0.33 0.00 0.72
Financial Debt to Book Capital 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.45 0.00 0.91
LT Financial Debt to Assets 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.67
LT Financial Debt to Book Capital 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.35 0.00 0.85
Panel B: Control Variable Measures
Variable Mean StDev 25th Median 75th Min Max
Size (real $mil) 1,045 3,331 36 140 562 0.33 26,676
Size (natural log of real net sales) 4.94 2.10 3.59 4.94 6.33 -1.10 10.19
Tangibility 0.25 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.36 0.01 0.90
Market-to-Book 2.00 2.09 0.80 1.25 2.27 0.31 11.25
ROA 0.04 0.23 -0.01 0.10 0.16 -0.89 0.40
Default Spread (in %) 0.89 0.26 0.64 0.81 1.06 0.55 1.41
GSP Growth Rate (in %) 3.78 2.43 2.20 3.70 5.90 -4.20 12.70
State Unemployment Rate (in %) 4.87 1.13 4.12 4.90 5.65 2.30 8.42
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Table 2
Oklahoma’s Adoption of Right-to-Work Legislation
Difference-in-Differences Analysis
This table presents the results of a difference-in-differences regression with additional covariates using an un-
balanced panel of firms. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the ratio of financial debt to book assets
and the key variable of interest is the “Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × Post” coefficient, i.e., δ1. H1a (Bargaining
Hypothesis) predicts a negative δ1, while H2a (Crowding-out Hypothesis) predicts a positive δ1. Oklahoma’s
neighboring states include Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas. Headquarters loca-
tions are verified as described in Section 2.2.4. Compustat variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. All
regressions in Panel A and C include an intercept term, a post dummy, an RTW (Oklahoma) dummy as well as
both industry-by-year and firm fixed effects. In addition, Columns (5) and (6) in Panel C include all remaining
interaction terms required for a triple difference analysis. Firm-level financial controls include size, market-to-
book ratio, ROA, tangibility, and modified Z-score. These variables are defined in Appendix B. The dynamic
analysis regression in Panel B includes an intercept term as well as firm, industry-by-year, and year fixed effects.
For ease of difference-in-differences interpretation, we drop RTW (Oklahoma) × Year=1998. Therefore, in the
dynamic analysis in Panel B, each coefficient of RTW (Oklahoma) × Year (t=1999 to 2004) can be interpreted
as the difference-in-differences for the respective year relative to 1998. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard er-
rors, clustered at the state-level are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences (Oklahoma)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All states Neighboring states
All
firm-
years
Non-
internet
firm-
years
Non-
internet
firm-
years
Non-
internet
firm-
years
Variable Predicted Sign
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × Post (δ1) H1a: δ1 < 0 0.015* 0.015* 0.024* 0.021*
H2a: δ1 > 0 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.016**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Market to Book Ratio −0.004***−0.005***−0.006** −0.006**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability −0.029** −0.033** −0.089***−0.088***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Tangibility 0.111*** 0.127*** 0.120 0.120
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Zprob −0.004***−0.004*** −0.006 −0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
State Union Membership −0.001
(0.01)
Drop Internet Firms (3-digit SIC 737) NO YES YES YES
Neighboring States Only NO NO YES YES
Firm and Industry-by-year Fixed Effects Yes YES YES YES
Treated OK Firms (firm-year observations) 49
(182)
48
(179)
48
(179)
48
(179)
Control Firms (firm-year observations) 5,361 4,536 620 620
(22,337) (19,313) (2,583) (2,583)
Total Firms (Observations) 5,410 4,584 668 668
(22,519) (19,492) (2,762) (2,762)
Adjusted R-squared 84% 84% 85% 85%
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Panel B: Dynamic Analysis (Test for Pre-treatment Trends and Reversals)
(1)
Neighboring states
(non-internet)
Variable Predicted Sign
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × 1999 (δt−2) H1a: δt−2 = 0 −0.020
H2a: δt−2 = 0 (0.01)
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × 2000 (δt−1) H1a: δt−2 = 0 0.027
H2a: δt−2 = 0 (0.02)
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × 2001 (δt) H1a: δt < 0 0.037**
H2a: δt > 0 (0.02)
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × 2002 (δt+1) H1a: δt+1 < 0 0.031**
H2a: δt+1 > 0 (0.01)
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × 2003 (δt+2) H1a: δt+2 < 0 0.024**
H2a: δt+2 > 0 (0.01)
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × 2004 (δt+3) H1a: δt+3 < 0 0.045***
H2a: δt+3 > 0 (0.00)
Control Variables YES
Year Dummies YES
Drop Internet Firms (3-digit SIC 737) YES
Neighboring States Only YES
Firm and Industry-by-year Fixed Effects YES
Treated OK Firms (firm-year observations) 48 (179)
Control Firms (firm-year observations) 620 (2,583)
Total Firms (Observations) 668 (2,762)
Adjusted R-squared 85%
Panel C: Difference-in-Differences (Industry Sub-samples)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) =
(1)vs.(3)
(6) =
(2)vs.(4)
Neighboring states (non-internet)
Sample Labor-
intensive
Union-
intensive
Less
Labor-
intensive
Less
Union-
intensive
Labor
vs.
Less
Labor-
Intensive
Union-
vs.
Less
Union-
intensive
Right-to-Work (Oklahoma) × Post (δ1) 0.075* 0.104* 0.004 −0.001
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
RTW × Post × LaborIntensiveIndustryDummy 0.050*
(0.03)
RTW × Post × UnionIntensiveIndustryDummy 0.110**
(0.05)
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Drop Internet Firms (3-digit SIC 737) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Neighboring States Only YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm and Industry-by-year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated OK Firms 20 13 33 35 48 48
Treated OK (firm-year observation) (75) (48) (104) (131) (179) (179)
Control Firms 299 194 444 426 620 620
Control (firm-year observations) (998) (778) (1,585) (1,805) (2,583) (2,583)
Adjusted R-squared 90% 84% 85% 85% 85% 85%
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Table 3
Abadie-Imbens Matching Estimator of the Average Treatment Effect for the
Treated
This table presents the results of the Abadie-Imbens matching estimator. This technique estimates the average
treatment effect, i.e., δ, by comparing the treatment group to a set of counterfactuals. Here, the counterfac-
tuals are chosen from the universe of potential controls by minimizing the Mahalanobis distance between size,
tangibility, market-to-book ratio, ROA, and ZProb. H1a (Bargaining Hypothesis) predicts a negative δ1, while
H2a (Crowding-out Hypothesis) predicts a positive δ1. Column 1 presents the results of the main test using the
adoption of the Right-to-work law in Oklahoma in 2001. Column 2 presents the results of the placebo test. For
this placebo test, all design aspects remain identical with one exception: the “treatment” period is arbitrarily
reassigned to 2000, 1999 and 1998, respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent and estimates
are corrected for matching bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Main Matching Tests
(1)
Neighboring states
(non-internet)
Year 2001
Variable Prediction
Sample Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (δ1) H1a: δ1 < 0 0.088*
- Financial Debt to Book Assets (three-year mean) H2a: δ1 > 0 (0.05)
Treated firms 13
Non-treated firms 193
Control firms 13
Panel B: Placebo Matching Tests
(1) (2) (3)
Neighboring states (non-internet)
Year 2000 Year 1999 Year 1998
Variable Prediction
Sample Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (δ1) Null 0.062 0.038 -0.029
- Financial Debt to Book Assets (three-year mean) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Treated firms 14 16 17
Non-treated firms 199 184 177
Control firms 14 16 17
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Table 4
Indiana’s Adoption of Right-to-Work Legislation
Falsification Experiment
This table presents the results of a difference-in-differences regression with additional covariates using an unbal-
anced panel of firms. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the ratio of financial debt to book assets and
the key variable of interest is the “Right-to-Work (Indiana) × Post” coefficient, i.e., δ1. H1a (Bargaining Hy-
pothesis) predicts a negative δ1, while H2a (Crowding-out Hypothesis) predicts a positive δ1. Panel A presents
the results from the sample period 2009 to 2013 (one year post) whilst Panel B includes 2009 to 2014 (two years
post). If the main findings from our cross-sectional time-series regressions as well as our quasi-experiment in Ok-
lahoma are not spurious, we expect to find evidence of a positive leverage response for treated firms in Indiana,
particularly in the shorter estimation window. Headquarters locations are verified as described in Section 2.2.4.
Compustat variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. All regressions include an intercept term, a post
dummy, an RTW (indiana) dummy, as well as both industry-by-year and firm fixed effects. Firm-level financial
controls include size, market-to-book ratio, ROA, tangibility, and modified Z-score. These variables are defined
in Panel B of Appendix B. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered at the state-level are provided
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences (Indiana)—2009 to 2013 (1 year post)
(1) (2)
All states Neighboring states
Predicted Sign
Right-to-Work (Indiana) × Post (δ1) H1a: δ1 < 0 0.009*** 0.011*
H2a: δ1 > 0 (0.00) (0.01)
Control Variables YES YES
Neighboring States Only NO YES
Treated IN firms (firm-year observations) 23 (151) 23 (151)
Control Firms (firm-year observations) 3,417 (12,469) 230 (862)
Total Firms (Observations) 3,440 (12,620) 253 (1,013)
Adjusted R-squared 88% 92%
Panel B: Difference-in-Differences (Indiana)—2009 to 2014 (2 years post)
(1) (2)
All states Neighboring states
Right-to-Work (Indiana) × Post (δ1) 0.005 0.006
(0.00) (0.01)
Control Variables YES YES
Neighboring States Only NO YES
Treated IN firms (firm-year observations) 23 (174) 23 (174)
Control Firms (firm-year observations) 3,550 (14,373) 237 (1,011)
Total Firms (Observations) 3,573 (14,547) 260 (1,185)
Adjusted R-squared 88% 92%
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Table 5
Largest Pension Bargaining Unit (LPBU) Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our firm-level bargaining power construct, LPBU. Panel A presents
means, standard deviations, and percentiles for LPBU. Panel B presents means and standard deviations for each
of eight industry classifications (according to the Department of Labor) as well as for all firms in our sample.
Firms are classified as unionized if there is evidence of collective bargaining from the EBSA Form 5500 database.
LPBU is calculated using the EBSA Form 5500 database as described in Section 3.3. It is important to note
that this is not a measure of total unionization but is instead the ratio of the largest collective bargaining unit
(with respect to retirement pensions) to total employees.
Panel A: Sample Classified by Union Status
Group Mean StDev. 25th Median 75th Obs
Percentile Percentile
Unionized Firms 34.49% 31.42% 6.59% 25.00% 57.83% 3,393
Panel B: Sample Classified by Industry
Division Mean StDev. Obs
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 1.23% 6.80% 93
Mining 3.61% 16.11% 1,143
Construction > 0.00% 0.05% 213
Manufacturing 5.18% 16.68% 15,849
Transportation and Communications 10.09% 26.14% 1,484
Wholesale Trade 5.55% 19.49% 1,045
Retail Trade 1.20% 8.00% 2,248
Services 1.10% 8.67% 6,499
All Firms 4.10% 15.55% 28,574
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Table 7
High-Dimensional Fixed Effects Regressions
of Bargaining Power and Financial Leverage
Panel A of this table presents the results from panel regressions regressions using two alternative measures of
book leverage on Largest Pension Bargaining Unit (LPBU) and a vector of controls. Columns 1, 2, 3, and
4 of Panel B present the results of the same regressions as Panel A for four additional measures of leverage.
Column 5 of Panel B presents the results of a regression on the subsample of firms with positive-leverage,
positive-LPBU, and a Cook’s Distance of less than 4 divided by the number of observations. In all regressions,
the key variable of interest is the LPBU coefficient, i.e., β1. H1b (Bargaining Hypothesis) predicts a positive
β1 > 0, while H2b (Crowding-out Hypothesis) predicts a negative β1 < 0. All variables are defined in Appendix
B. Compustat variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. All regressions include an intercept term as
well as both industry-by-year and firm fixed effects. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered at
the firm-level are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level respectively. a The restrictions placed on the observations included in this specification result in a
significant reduction in sample size.
Panel A: Financial Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Variables Predicted
Sign
Financial
Debt to Book
Assets
Financial
Debt to Book
Capital
LT Financial
Debt to Book
Assets
LT Financial
Debt to Book
Capital
LPBU (β1) H1b: β1 > 0 -0.018* -0.025** -0.019** -0.027**
H2b: β1 < 0 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.022***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market to Book Ratio -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability -0.050*** -0.092*** -0.038*** -0.070***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Tangibility 0.104*** 0.163*** 0.098*** 0.154***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Zprob -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 28,574 28,574 28,574 28,574
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Industry-by-year FE YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 78% 78% 78% 78%
R-squared within 10% 10% 10% 10%
Panel B: Financial Market Leverage and Total Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable
Variable Predicted
Sign
Financial
Debt to
Market
Assets
Financial
Debt to
Market
Capital
Total Li-
abilities
to
Market
Assets
Total Li-
abilities
to Book
Assets
Financial
Debt to
Book
Assets
LPBU (β1) H1b: β1 > 0 -0.020** -0.029** -0.029** -0.018* -0.048*
H2b: β1 < 0 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
All Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-by-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 28,530 28,530 28,530 28,574 1,594a
Adjusted R-squared 78% 79% 79% 79% 84%
R-squared within 10% 18% 18% 18% 41%
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Figure 1: Bargaining Power of Labor (LPBU) Time Series
Figure 1 tracks the conditional density of the largest firm-level bargaining unit (with respect to retirement
pensions) by industry division (for divisions with more than 1,000 firm-year observations), as measured by
equation (3).
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